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The ancient disease anthrax is suddenly and dramatically 
in the news. To date, seventeen cases have been identi- 
fied in the United States, and four persons have died. All 
cases appear to derive from the deliberate spiking of let- 
ters with pure cultures of Bacillus antbracis. In response, 
the American public and medical communities have 
scrambled to develop an understanding of what to expect 
from the disease, including its natural history and atten- 
dant mortality rate. From our relative ignorance, in mid- 
October, literally thousands of noses were cultured and 
a comparable number of prescriptions written, all in 
hopes of averting a public health calamity 
Among other things, the current scare has revealed 
just how little we know about anthrax. The search for pre- 
viously reported outbreaks, our traditional source of infor- 
mation, reveals a surprisingly bare cupboard, except for 
the celebrated 1979 outbreak in Sverdlovsk, a Soviet city 
of 1.2 million persons. l The remarkable particulars of the 
story, both the outbreak and how it came to be reported, 
have become legend in the medical literature; and, impor- 
tantly, many of our assumptions and expectations regard- 
ing the most feared form of anthrax, inhalational disease, 
derive from this reportYet complete reliance on this out- 
break for the facts about anthrax may actually be serving 
to conflate an already overheated situation. 
A careful reading of the article reveals a wonder of 
detective work. The cleverness and tenacity of the inves- 
tigators in overcoming almost comically profound obsta- 
cles are remarkable and even inspiring. The authors began 
their investigation some 13 years after the event itself and 
were faced with missing records, faded memories, and the 
chaos anticipated when one tries to reconstruct events so 
long after the fact. Nevertheless, they persevered and 
uncovered such remarkable details as the wind direction 
each day in April 1979 (kept by the local airport) and the 
number of dead sheep in downwind towns. From this, 
they were able to conclude that a plume of B. anthracis 
had been released from a known military facility and was 
carried by a north wind, and that numerous persons had 
contracted inhalation anthrax from the exposure. 
A subplot emerges from their investigation as well. 
The KGB destroyed most of the records and appears to 
have impeded investigations. The official explanation was 
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that the epidemic had been caused by ingestion of 
anthrax-tainted meat, a very unusual complication. Per- 
haps involved in this obfuscation was the chief Commu- 
nist Party official for the region, BorisYeltsin. In 1992,13 
years after the epidemic and soon after the fall of the 
Iron Curtain, now President Yeltsin (mimbile dictu) report- 
edly conceded “the KGB admitted that our military devel- 
opments were the cause [of the epidemic].“* 
As remarkable as the story is, however, a method- 
ologic flaw looms large, something that even these inge- 
nious investigators could not overcome. We simply do 
not know the true denominator of persons at risk, the 
number exposed, or the actual number of infected per- 
sons. When, after 9 days of unexplained illnesses, health 
authorities identified anthrax as the cause, they organized 
an impressive response, with triage to a designated health 
care facility, aggressive medical support of the very ill, 
distribution of tetracycline to households where a case 
had occurred, and an active vaccine campaign. However, 
no active case finding was undertaken to identify sub- 
clinical cases or persons who had received antibiotics 
for nonspecific symptoms, including those administered 
tetracycline by the health authorities. 
Thus, the familiar SO+% mortality rate for inhalational 
anthrax established by this study may in fact be inflated. 
Unless anthrax operates by a set of rules unique among 
bacteria, one would expect to encounter a spectrum of 
disease, from the subclinical to the mild to the routine to 
the severe. The denominator used for this report, of neces- 
sity, was restricted to the group sick enough to be hos- 
pitalized or to have died. In other words, any sick persons 
who recovered without hospitalization were excluded, 
concentrating only the most ill patients in the report. 
Furthermore, we have little idea of the attack rate for 
the town. The authors were able to determine a 1 to 2% 
incidence among workers at an affected ceramics factory. 
The population at highest risk from the plume was thought 
to number at least 7000 and thousands more downwind 
who might have been at risk for inhalation of a lower spore 
inoculum.Yet, the official number of cases was only 96, 
with information on 77 reported in the article. Thus, the 
doomsday scenario, wherein a single anthrax release results 
in the death of millions, may be overstated.Yes, this is a 
remarkably frightening disease, and yes, the ease of pro 
duction and stability of spores make this a most worri- 
some weapon, and yes, the arsenal of pathogenic exotoxins 
available to B. anthacis is alarming indeed.Yet, it does not 
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seem to be quite the lethal weapon that we so fear, but 
rather a disease that open-eyed doctors, informed patients, 
and a well-funded public health infrastructure can contain 
if not prevent. 
Our current predicament with anthrax and other 
potential agents of bioterror demonstrates the short- 
sightedness of decades of inadequate funding and atten- 
tion to countless diseases, infectious and otherwise. The 
frantic catch-up we are attempting now may be suc- 
cessful, and yet, one wonders if the largest lesson of all 
will be overlooked: that funds directed to biomedical 
research are never wasted, no matter the apparent obscu- 
rity of the disease or eccentricity of the question. With 
enough time, every disease seems, unfortunately, to have 
its moment. 
Perhaps most of all, the events of recent weeks in 
New York City and Washington underline the need for a 
cool head and steady hand from local public health and 
infectious disease experts in times of panic. Despite 
incomplete information, insufficient diagnostic tools, and 
an overheated public, good decisions were made that 
were based on coldblooded facts, not fears and what- 
would-happen-if scenarios. The only cure for anthrax anx- 
iety, it seems, is control of anthrax itself. And this can 
only be achieved by the relentless pursuit of the epi- 
demiologic, clinical, molecular biologic, and microbio- 
logic facts about the new and old enemy, Bacillus 
anthracis. 
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